Elbridge Colby's NATO 3.0 means Europe needs JEF 2.0

When the Pentagon's policy chief Elbridge Colby first coined the term “NATO 3.0” — a security concept that "requires much greater efforts by our allies to step up and assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe" — nobody really knew how it was going to work, or if this was even a real shift.

But evolution has always been the norm. NATO 1.0 was born out of the American interest to contain the greatest threat to American security — the Soviet Union — and to ensure peace on the European continent. Over time, transatlantic cooperation became much more than mere containment. The alliance was glued together by shared values that allowed it to rebuild Europe, providing stability and economic growth. With time it also became a force projection vehicle for the United States. And after the end of the Cold War NATO 2.0 allowed all of Europe, east and west, to unify in a single secure space.

Throughout the following decades the threats and our perceptions shifted. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union. The threat of terrorism came and faded away. Today, the biggest threat is arguably from a revisionist Russia, or from a failure to adapt and react to it.

Putin is already escalating all over Europe, this time with sub-conventional means — attempted assassinations, cable cuttings, arson attempts and, as of late, armed drone incursions in the Baltics. Being cornered in Ukraine, he might be tempted to test NATO's Eastern Flank and in that way challenge the decades-long transatlantic commitment to collective security. If Putin were successful, the European security architecture would be demolished and the West's credibility to defend its allies would be left in tatters.

The fact that the concept of NATO 3.0 is being put forward right now should tell Europeans that America’s interests in European security have shifted dramatically. The National Security Strategy, released late last year, points out that Russia should be diplomatically managed rather than contained. And despite the ongoing war on the European continent, the document does not name Russia as a threat worthy of attention. That should tell us that NATO 3.0 is no longer a suggested direction, it is very much a reality and Europeans are being left mostly on their own.

Elbridge Colby, in his book "The Strategy of Denial", writes that if the Baltic States are attacked, the United States will come to European aid only after the threat of China has been contained. To a pessimist (or realist), this could also mean a very, very long time between the initial attack and the US coming to Europe's aid. Colby implies that the US is still interested in European security, but is unable to devote the resources needed to deter attacks. But what if the US were no longer interested? What if a political settlement with concessions on Europe's part were something that the administration started to pursue? I am not saying that there is no chance that the US would come to Europe’s aid — it did come twice over the last century. It is just that living in this uncertainty is becoming too dangerous. 

The most dramatic loss caused by the shift is with regard to deterrence. Every tweet from the US administration about the weak Europeans, every hint of unwillingness to uphold Article 5, and every news report about the troop withdrawal or removal of American commanders from NATO structures sends a signal to Putin that the security environment in Europe is weakening. For Russian military strategists, NATO 3.0 is a gift. It solves one of the greatest strategic dilemmas for Russians wishing to redraw European borders — the US is no longer seen as an obstacle in this endeavour. The only remaining question in their minds is: will Europeans be divided, leaderless and slow enough to facilitate their own defeat? In other words, are Europeans now unable to meaningfully resist further Russian escalations?

Time for JEF 2.0

Instead of clinging to their nostalgic past, Europeans need to be ready to meet the Russian challenge in a way that deters Russia from attacking Europe in the first place, even in the absence of US backup.

First of all, Europe needs to start building a post-transatlantic security environment. The threat to Eastern Flank security has direct security implications not just for the smaller European countries in the East, but also for Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It would fall primarily on the shoulders of these countries to lay out the strengthened deterrence plan for the Eastern Flank. Since Colby’s NATO 3.0 arrangement is untested in battle and could be paralysed in the face of a real contingency without US guidance, an alternative structure is needed.

Where Europeans should look for a solution is the British-led JEF. It is built to be a first responder in the Eastern European contingency, working in parallel with NATO. Relying solely on old NATO structures is becoming untenable, and expectations that the European Union will create its own security architecture are low. That is why a coalition not only of the willing, but also the ready and able, is exactly what Europe now needs — a structure that would be capable of responding to a threat quickly and decisively. Indeed, the structure could go beyond JEF and expand to include other European countries. Poland and Germany top the list. If, for some reason, the United Kingdom were unwilling to use JEF for this purpose, a new structure — maybe Polish-, French- or German-led — should be created instead.

To deter effectively, resources from this new European defence structure need to preposition in the East. From troops to equipment, most of what would be needed for the first days of fighting should be located as close to the battlefield as possible. It is dangerous to rely only on intelligence and perfect logistics — prepositioning would enable Europe to fight on day one, giving Russia much less time to achieve its objectives before the cavalry arrives. During the Cold War, some 400,000 American troops were stationed in Europe to guard NATO's border with the Warsaw Pact countries. Now a task of similar magnitude is mostly carried out by the Eastern Flank countries themselves, and that might not be enough to make Putin think twice about doing something stupid.

An important and in fact critical component is this: European security structure is no longer viable without Ukraine. Ukrainians have the largest, most battlefield-experienced army in Europe, a formidable and growing military industry, and, most importantly, a doctrine of fighting a war against Russia without US support. Theirs is exactly the scenario the rest of Europe is facing. The debate about Ukraine joining NATO has led nowhere, but the fact remains that Ukraine would be a huge asset to her allies in any defence organisation she chose to join. A JEF-like structure that includes Ukraine would allow the most enthusiastic Europeans to accelerate cooperation in Ukraine’s defence while also strengthening European deterrence, acting as a multiplier for both hard and soft power. Russians might be right in thinking Europeans are not prepared for a drone war today, but in a formal, coherent and powerful alliance with Ukrainians — things would be very different tomorrow.

The trillion dollar question — will willing Europeans actually unite and do this? There is no reason to think they lack capacity. Ukraine is already doing most of the hard work on her own, so I am sure a structure containing larger and richer countries would have enough resources to be able to help out. The framework already exists, ready to be built on, making it a very attractive and practical option.

Choosing this option should be easy, because if Europeans want to remain safe, prosperous and free — there is no other option.